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Introduction 
The institutional environment of Portuguese banking during the Golden Age years 
of economic growth (1950-1973) was criticized in many instances, at the time and in 
recent literature. Direct observers of the period, such as Wallich (1951) and Pereira 
(1953, 1956a, and 1956b), and historians including Sérgio (1990) and Valério (2010) 
have stressed two main aspects of that environment: excessive protection, allowing 
banks to obtain high rents, something that would have deterred them from competing 
and innovating; and excessive concentration of their activity on short-term commercial 
paper, thus preventing them from contributing effectively to finance growth. 
Such supposed features of the banking system seem to be in contradiction, 
however, with the high growth rates of the years 1950 to 1973, the best in terms of 
economic growth in all of Portugal’s history (cf. Amaral, 2010). The apparent 
contradiction is not limited to Portugal, in fact, as rapid growth in many economies in 
that period occurred within a framework of heavily regulated financial systems. This is 
what Monnet (2012) has appropriately called the “financial paradox” of the Golden 
Age. It is difficult to reconcile the idea that a relatively free and competitive financial 
system is essential to finance investment at efficient prices (e.g, Freixas and Rochet, 
1997,  Guzmán, 2000, or Barth et al., 2001) with the fast growth seen during the Golden 
Age. 
The “paradox” only exists, of course, if we believe that an environment of 
competition is the one that assures the most efficient outcome in terms of investment 
and capital accumulation. But some authors have questioned this idea, based on the 
notion that banking is an activity with special features. Petersen and Rajan (1995), for 
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instance, have suggested that banks with more market power engage more easily in 
“relationship lending”, something that would lead them to supply more credit to young 
firms. Since young firms are riskier than established ones, banks in a highly competitive 
environment would tend to increase interest rates in order to accommodate such higher 
risk, whereas banks with market power would compensate for the risk by sharing in the 
future profits of those firms. By allowing interest rates to remain low, they would thus 
increase the amount of credit available for the economy. Cetorelli and Peretto (2000) 
provide another example in favour of imperfect competition in banking. According to 
them, a smaller number of banks would screen the quality of their potential clients more 
completely than would a larger number, and would thus be able to better choose the best 
borrowers. As a result of this greater confidence, they would lend more, increasing 
capital accumulation and growth (for a more complete discussion of these and other 
related topics, see Northcott, 2004). 
These are works in economic theory. But when we turn to economic history, we 
find few authors who have sought to deal directly with the “financial paradox” of the 
Golden Age. Such important works as AAVV (1994) and Cassis et al. (1995) make a 
thorough description of the various national legal frameworks but do not assess the 
impact of those frameworks on the actual behavior of the agents in the market or on the 
growth performance of the various economies. Only a few more recent works have 
sought to go beyond such limited analyses. Some have followed the path of showing 
how the institutional environment of financial repression was not enough to fully curtail 
competition: Battilossi (2000), for instance, demonstrated how the increasing openness 
of western financial systems during the 1960s led to greater competition between banks 
at both the national and international levels; Capie and Billings (2004) advanced 
“evidence of competition in English commercial banking between 1920 and 1970”, 
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despite the formal and informal mechanisms in place to limit it; and Pueyo (2003) did 
the same for Spain between 1922 and 1995. 
Other works have followed a different path, namely that of suggesting that 
financial repression was ultimately irrelevant for growth. Some countries would provide 
clear examples of how it was possible to find means of financing investment that were 
independent of the existence of a more or less competitive financial system. Wyplosz 
(1999) pays particular attention to the cases of Belgium, France, and Italy. In Belgium, 
with credit ceilings in place and price competition almost forbidden, banks tried to 
match the demand for credit with a vast increase of the branch network, setting the 
country apart in international comparisons in this respect. In France, with the largest 
banks nationalized, restrictions should have been extremely high. But Wyplosz tells us 
of the chain connection through which banks obtained subsidized funding from 
specialized public institutions, then using those funds for investment at very low rates 
(even if in ventures favoured by the Government). This, together with a lax monetary 
policy, allowed the economy to have abundant funds for growth. In Italy, despite public 
ownership of most banks, the system worked with very few restrictions. Both 
Quenouëlle-Corre (2005) and Monnet (2012) also stress the positive effects of the 
complex system existing in France. 
As we show in this paper, Portugal is an interesting case in the international 
perspective. As in the rest of the western world, Portugal’s banks were very tightly 
regulated, although in some respects less stringently so. For instance, Portuguese 
legislation never imposed the total separation between commercial and investment 
banking, never nationalized (fully or substantially) the banking sector, and never forced 
banks to keep a certain amount of public bonds in their portfolio. The legal framework 
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was thus very restrictive but at the same time left a series of loopholes open, and banks 
used them in order to circumvent its restraints and compete with each other. 
The signs of competition were various. We present them in this work in an 
essentially descriptive way.  Much along the lines of Capie and Billings (2004), we 
provide “evidence” of competition, leaving for some future work a formal test of the 
presence of that competition and the degree to which it existed. This approach is 
justified by the lack of basic works presenting the main facts of the history of 
Portuguese commercial banks in this period. We make a case that competition resides at 
the origin of the modernization of Portuguese banking, mostly in two dimensions: the 
growth of time deposits and geographical expansion. The fact that this represented only 
some form of imperfect competition does not mean that it was not an integral part of the 
behavior of Portuguese banks. In order to compare with other western countries, we 
provide some benchmarks. Despite the difficulties involved in these comparisons, due 
to many national specificities, we believe that the data presented are enough at least to 
show that the indicators for Portuguese banks did not differ greatly from those of their 
counterparts in other countries. 
The remainder of this paper is as follows. Section 1 presents the main features of 
the monetary regime and the banking legislation, stressing the very tight rules in place, 
designed to hinder competition. Section 2 briefly describes the Portuguese banking 
system between 1950 and 1973, with special attention to the degree of concentration in 
the market and the behavior of the seven most important banks. Section 3 presents the 
evidence gathered for those seven banks regarding cash ratios, interest rates, deposits, 
branching, capital ratios, and profitability. 
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1. Fiscal policy, monetary policy, and banking regulation 
1.1 Fiscal and monetary policy 
The Golden Age years of economic growth in Portugal coincided with an 
authoritarian regime lasting for 41 years (1933 to 1974). The beginning of the regime 
came at the end of a long sequence of stabilization measures that had started in 1922. 
The goal of these measures was to solve the public finance and monetary issues 
stemming from World War I and its aftermath. World War I created an extraordinarily 
difficult situation for the country’s public accounts, leading to persistent budget deficits, 
growing public debt, and quasi-hyperinflation. These were countered through a series of 
fiscal and monetary reforms in 1922, 1924, 1929, and 1931, together constituting a 
stabilization programme that was able to re-balance the budget and halt inflation. Their 
success can be measured by the ability of the Government to take the escudo back to the 
gold-exchange standard in 1931 (Valério, 1984, Santos, 1994, Carvalho, 2000, and 
Silva and Amaral, 2011). Even if the return was short-lived (as barely six months later 
Portugal abandoned the system again), this was not the result of renewed fiscal and 
monetary imbalance - quite the contrary: Portugal simply followed Britain when sterling 
was devalued and its convertibility suspended. But even after doing this, Portuguese 
authorities continued to follow a rule that sought to emulate the conditions of the gold 
standard (Valério, 1984, and Silva and Amaral, 2011). 
Crucial for the adoption of this rule were the principles of fiscal balance and low 
inflation to which the Estado Novo adhered quite closely. Very rarely did the 
Government present an unbalanced budget during this long political regime, something 
that was essential for the neutral monetary policy required by Gold Standard 
membership. From 1931 onward the monetary base was indexed to the position of the 
balance of payments, more specifically to the availability of foreign currency and gold 
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as reserves at the Bank of Portugal. In 1946, following a bout of capital flight, the 
Government established a money emission regime in which the currency issued by the 
Bank of Portugal should be covered by reserves of gold and foreign currency in a 
proportion of 50% (half in gold). This was the rule prevailing from 1950 to 1973 
(Amaral, 2003). 
This policy was important for banks (and the economy) for two main reasons. 
First, banks were not used to finance budget deficits and public debt, as in many other 
countries. In Belgium, France, and Italy, where fiscal imbalance was the norm, banks 
were forced to hold certain proportions of public bonds in their portfolios (Wyplosz, 
1999). Second, it had the potential to influence almost directly the amount of money 
received as deposits by banks: the expansion or contraction of money emission 
according to the reserves of the Bank of Portugal, in turn determined by the balance of 
payments, should be the main cause of expansion or contraction of deposits in banks. 
Doubts have been raised over the actual adherence of the Bank of Portugal to the rule 
(Sérgio, 1990). But even if there was some breach of the principle, there is no doubt that 
banks had considerable opportunities to expand their activity, as Portugal persistently 
maintained a positive international payments position. 
 
1.2 Banking regulation 
The financial problems resulting from World War I had a very serious impact on 
commercial banks. Attempting to profit from the speculative environment generated by 
rising public debt and monetary indiscipline, many banks sprouted until 1925, but 
almost as many failed, sometimes after only a few months of activity. To the 23 joint-
stock banks existing in 1914, 17 new ones appeared by 1925, while 16 failed (Reis, 
8 
 
1994, see also Valério, 2006). The government sought to tame this hectic activity with a 
new banking law in 1925. 
The new law was quite similar to those then in place in the rest of the Western 
world. As did Portugal, and for similar reasons, most countries implemented quite 
restrictive legislation (a summary for various countries can be found in AAVV, 1994, 
and Cassis et al., 1995). The new rules in most countries called for a) the introduction of 
the principle of discretionary governmental authorization for the opening of banks, b) 
high capital requirements, c) liquidity requirements, and d) the establishment of interest 
rates determined by law. In most countries there was also an attempt to separate the 
investment and commercial activities of banks, as commercial banks in general had 
assumed a “universal” nature since the nineteenth century and had, thus, increased the 
interest and liquidity risks. The Portuguese legislation included all these features, but 
never went so far as totally forbidding commercial banks from engaging in investment, 
as in the US or Belgium; and never went so far either as to fully nationalize the banking 
sector (as in Italy in the 1920s or in Austria in 1946) or even a large part of it (as in 
France or Germany in 1945). 
In 1950 the law in place was still Decree 10,634, from 20 March 1925. The law 
was based on a series of prudential rules. It imposed high capital requirements for the 
creation of new banks and for those already functioning (500,000 gold-escudos for 
incorporated banks and 250,000 gold-escudos for non-incorporated banks opening or 
functioning in Lisbon and Porto; 200,000 and 100,000, respectively, for those opening 
or functioning outside these two cities). The main purpose of the legislation was to 
prevent commercial banks from engaging in long-term financing and restrict them to 
effective “commercial” activity (collecting deposits and short-term lending). Special 
attention was devoted to cash reserves. Both incorporated and non-incorporated banks 
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were required to keep cash reserves equal to at least 20% of demand deposits. The 
remaining 80% had to be backed by credit instruments of no more than three months’ 
maturity. Banks were also forbidden to grant credit above 10% of the bank’s own 
capital to any individual or firm. This would later be complemented with a further rule 
coming from Law 1,894, of 11 April 1935, according to which banks could not acquire 
stock of other firms in a value higher than their reserve fund. 
Banks were also limited in the amount of interest they could charge, both on 
deposits (from the liabilities side) and on loans and commercial credit (from the assets 
side). Interest on demand deposits was limited to half of the Bank of Portugal’s 
rediscount rate, and interest on loans and commercial paper could not exceed that same 
rate by more than 1.5% (Decree 20,983, of 7 March, 1932). Consequently, banks 
operated on a tight margin of interest, and one that was determined exogeneously. The 
law, however, did not establish limits on interest offered on time deposits. 
In addition to all of this, government authorization was needed to open a bank 
(even when adhering to the requirements of the law), for a bank to merge with (or 
acquire) another bank, and to open branches. 
Mention must also be made here of Law 1,894, of 11 April 1935, even if it was 
enacted only in a patchy way. The law was an attempt to overhaul the banking system, 
but was never fully complemented with the necessary companion legislation. Still, some 
of its principles were applied: besides the rule (noted above) concerning ownership of 
stock of other firms, the law established that the number of banks should be frozen until 
1940, except by transformation of non-incorporated banks into incorporated ones or by 
mergers between existing banks, and even then only after governmental authorization 
(note that this rule was applied very strictly by the Government, not just until 1940 but 
in reality until 1974). 
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It is easy to see that according to this institutional setting, banks had very limited 
freedom of action: deprived of an interest rate policy and forced to hold high cash 
reserves, they could not lend in the long run and could apply in stocks or bonds only a 
very limited portion of their resources. Also, if they wished to expand geographically, 
the government’s authorisation was needed. It is possible (and this is an important idea 
of much of the literature on Portuguese banks) that such lack of freedom was somehow 
seen by them as advantageous, due especially to the protection of their position in the 
market. The rules preventing free mergers or acquisitions as well as entries in the 
market might have contributed to such protection: since the market was not freely 
contestable, this gave them an apparent free hand to engage in anti-competitive 
practices. Still, this requires some qualification: mergers, acquisitions, and entries were 
dependent of governmental authorisation but were not forbidden. This means that, 
although restricted, the threat of exclusion from the market still existed. 
The institutional framework resulting from the combination of Decree 10,634 and 
Law 1,894 was criticized at the time on several bases. The first criticism came from 
Henry C. Wallich, an American economist working in the context of Marshall Aid, who 
wrote a report on the Portuguese financial system in 1951. According to Wallich (1951), 
“Portugal’s credit system is well developed in some fields, less so in others. Facilities 
for short-term commercial bank credit are ample […]. [But] in the fields of agricultural 
and colonial credit, and of long term credit and capital for industry, much progress is 
still possible”. Many Portuguese economists and political actors would later repeat the 
main thrust of this opinion. Pereira (1953) (one of the leading banking specialists of the 
time) noted that, “in terms of credit, the natural ability of Portuguese banks is 
concentrated in the short- and medium-run, as the liquidity principle limits strongly the 
use of capital for long-run periods”. In a later work, Pereira (1956b) insisted that by 
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keeping such high levels of liquidity, “the commercial banks do not want, or cannot, 
channel the capital they have available to finance operations” (similar observations can 
be found in Pereira, 1956a)
1
. 
Many of these criticisms have been echoed in recent literature, such as Sérgio 
(1990), according to whom the Portuguese commercial banking system in the 1950s 
was defined by “excess liquidity […] and the apparently almost exclusive financing of 
commercial activity. [...] The protectionism in which the market lived and the restrictive 
rules in which the firms acted pushed competitors away and allowed them to obtain 
such high rents that they could operate in an environment of excess liquidity (without 
need to find profitable operations)”
2
. Valério (2010) also noted that “the restrictions put 
by the existing legislation and the dominant practices of the banks generated a situation 
of excess reserves that can be truly classified as structural”
3
. 
Some authors have noted how certain practices partially corrected the situation. 
According to Wallich (1951), for instance, a “factor that affects the volume of credit 
that can be built up within the limits given by legal reserve requirements is the 
inclusion, in legal reserves, of deposits in other commercial and savings banks. The law 
permits the banks to count as reserves not only their holdings of notes of, and deposits 
in, the Bank of Portugal, but also their deposits in third banks. This practice makes 
possible an expansion of credit beyond what would be feasible on the basis of reserves 
in the form of Bank of Portugal notes and deposits alone.” The same author also noted 
that “the severity of the limitation [on cash reserves] is tempered by the fact […] that 
the 90 day category includes long-term securities that are traded in the market, as well 
as drafts and current-account credits that mature only nominally within 90 days and are, 
in fact, renewable for longer periods”. 
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Accurate or not, such criticisms inspired important legislative changes. The most 
important of these was a new legislation package aimed at a full reorganization of the 
banking system (Decree-Law 41,403, of 27 November 1957, and Decree-Law 42,641, 
of 12 November 1959). The amount of capital required for banks to function was raised: 
existing banks in Lisbon and Porto could keep their doors open as long as their capital 
reached 30 million escudos, and 10 million if they functioned outside of those two 
cities. For new banks, however, initial capital had to reach 50 million escudos in Lisbon 
and Porto, and 20 million in other localities. 
There were still strict limits regarding the acquisition of stock of firms: these 
values could never represent more than the reserve fund plus 20% of the capital of the 
banks and could not exceed 20% of the capital of the firm. But prudential rules 
concerning the size and composition of cash reserves were altered in a less restrictive 
way. Now, instead of covering 20% of demand deposits, cash reserves were to cover 
only 15% of demand deposits and of time deposits of less than one month. They should 
also cover 5% of time deposits of more than one month. The remaining percentage of 
deposits not covered by primary cash reserves had to be covered either with liquid 
assets or assets with a maturity period of preferably three months and never more than 
one year. These limits changed several times until 1973,
 
with the purpose of increasing 
the ability of commercial banks to lend for longer periods (by reducing the size of cash 
reserves and increasing the maturity of the assets present in the secondary reserve) 
(Valério, 2010). 
The 1957-59 legislation sought to deal with the question of long-run lending 
through other means, such as the creation of a new type of bank: the investment bank. 
Banks of this sort would need an initial capital of 300 million escudos, with at least one 
member of the board nominated by the Government. This was followed, in 1958, with 
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Decree-Law 41,957, of 13 November, creating an investment bank, the National 
Development Bank (Banco de Fomento Nacional), with initial capital of 1 billion 
escudos, 61% of it owned by the Government. 
The 1957-1959 legislative framework would be complemented and changed by 
new measures taken during the 1960s. First, Decree-Law 46,492, of 18 August 1965, 
for the first time limited the rates offered on time deposits. The same legal document 
and Decree-Law 47,910, of 7 October 1967 authorized commercial banks to make loans 
for more than two years, as long as they were based on time deposits (loans for longer 
periods had to be based on the capital of the banks). Decree-Law 48,948, of 3 April 
1969, allowed banks to make loans from one to five years, as long as they were based 
on six-month time deposits or on bonds. 
One further element of the legislative environment faced by the Portuguese 
banking sector that needs mention is its position within the corporatist institutions 
typical of the Estado Novo. Since this regime defined itself as being “corporatist”, it 
sought to cover most social and economic activities with the appropriate institutions. 
Accordingly, the banking sector was granted a representative in the Corporatist 
Chamber, a consultative legislative body created in 1933. In April 1935, the above 
mentioned Law 1,894 created the National Credit Council (Conselho Nacional de 
Crédito), where representatives of the Government and the banking sector should meet 
to deal with issues affecting the market. Although this institutional environment had the 
potential of giving bankers an instance for exerting control over the market, the few 
indications we have are that the council never had a great role in disciplining it. Despite 
various agreements between bankers, they were not respected (see below). On 24 
November 1936, an Authorization of the National Institute for Labour and Social 
Security (Alvará do Instituto Nacional do Trabalho e Previdência) created the official 
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(corporatist) bankers’ association (Grémio Nacional dos Bancos e Casas Bancárias), 
devoted mostly to negotiating labour conditions with the sector’s unions, along with a 
limited role in coordinating the market. In July 1949 (Decree-Law 37,470) a General 
Inspection of Credit and Insurance was created, to supervise the activity of banks and 
insurance companies. On 23 September 1957, the Government authorized the creation 
of the Credit and Insurance Corporation, even if, according to Valério (2010), it had “a 
negligible role in Portuguese banking life”. 
 
2. Some preliminary indications of competition 
The new legislation of 1957-1959 did not change the repressive nature of the 
institutional framework. Both the observers of the period and recent historians seem to 
suggest, nevertheless, that, in spite of it, banks still benefited from a cosy environment. 
Although not founded in any explicit theory, Sérgio’s (1990) idea that banks enjoyed 
such high rents that they could sit on a pile of cash reserves in excess of the legal 
requirement (something that is also stressed by Wallich, 1951, Pereira, 1953, 1956a, 
1956b, and Valério, 2010) raises some issues. 
First, the idea implies that banks somehow enjoyed some form of “excess profits”. 
Only under such conditions could they forgo income earned in credit instruments, 
keeping much of their assets in sterile cash reserves. Under perfect competition no 
existing agents in the market can influence the price, and profit maximization takes 
place at the point where marginal cost equals marginal revenue. “Excess profits” for 
such a long period as the one studied here can only exist, then, if marginal revenue 
consistently exceeds marginal cost, and this is only possible if some of form of 
protected oligopoly exists. Under such conditions agents are able to determine either the 
price or the quantity of the product in the market, and this can happen only if there are 
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high barriers to entry. Banking in itself is not an activity with high natural barriers or 
initial costs. Consequently, any barriers must be institutional. Such barriers existed in 
the Portuguese banking market, as discussed above, in mainly two ways: high initial 
capital requirements and discretionary authorisation by the Government (which 
additionally had adopted a cum grano salis no-new-entrants rule). Under such 
conditions, particularly the rule preventing new entrants, it seems that Portuguese banks 
could adopt anti-competitive practices without much fear of being put out of business. 
The only hard data the literature presents in favour of this idea, however, is the 
high cash ratio (excess reserves) of Portuguese banks. No figures on profits are 
presented and, consequently, no definition of what “excess profits” (or “rents”, in the 
words of Sérgio, 1990) would be, and how to interpret the existing profit rates. “Excess 
profits” is one feature of an oligopolistic market. But other potential results of a market 
of such sort could be the establishment of output quotas, or profit sharing between the 
agents in the market. In those circumstances we would no longer be in the presence of 
simply an oligopolistic market, but of a cartel, too. The conditions existing in the 
Portuguese banking market, mostly through actions within the corporatist institutions, 
could be propitious to that. 
The second idea implied by the literature is that the high liquidity of Portuguese 
banks represented some form of credit rationing. Protected by existing conditions in the 
market, banks would have been able to abdicate from engaging in credit activities, since 
their profitability was high enough even without the full use of the resources at their 
disposal. But by doing so they would have limited the amount of credit to the economy, 
with the necessary negative effects on investment and growth. 
We challenge such ideas in this and the next sections. Although not conveying the 
image of an environment of freedom, we nevertheless point to the presence of some 
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form of competition. In this section we provide some preliminary indicators, with a 
more thorough analysis in the following ones. 
In 1950 the Portuguese banking system comprised 22 incorporated commercial 
banks, 13 non-incorporated banking houses, and 20 savings banks (INEb, 1953). 
Incorporated commercial banks dominated the market, accounting for roughly 69% of 
all deposits (up from 40% in 1938, cf. Roquette et al., 1968) and about 50% of the 
credit (48% in 1950, 51% in 1951, INEa, 1950). Non-incorporated banks were residual, 
with a market share in terms of deposits of about 1.5% (INEa, 1950). Most of the 20 
savings banks were of small size, with the exception of the National Savings Bank 
(Caixa Geral de Depósitos). Savings banks accounted for about 30% of deposits but 
most of this came precisely from the Caixa Geral de Depósitos (CGD), which 
represented 90% of all deposits in savings banks and was the largest financial institution 
in the country, with a market share of around 27% in deposits and 30% in credit 
(Figures 1 and 2). 
CGD was a special sort of institution. In 1929 it had been the object of an 
important reform: its name was changed to Caixa Geral de Depósitos, Crédito e 
Previdência, and, annex to the Caixa Geral de Depósitos itself, two new institutions 
were created, a National Savings Bank (Caixa Nacional de Crédito) and a National 
Social Security Bank (Caixa Nacional de Previdência) (see Reis, 1997, and Lains, 
2008). The latter was to manage the pension funds of various types of public servants. 
The former should act as an investment bank, using the Caixa Geral de Depósitos’ 
funds to invest in agricultural and industrial activities. One avowed reason for the 
Caixa’s transformation into an investment bank was the inability of regular commercial 
banks to lend in the long term (Reis, 1997). There were also 10 credit companies, 
among which only one was of significant size. 
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The seven largest commercial banks in 1950 (Figures 1 and 2) were Banco 
Espírito Santo & Comercial de Lisboa (BESCL), the market leader since 1947, with a 
share of deposits of roughly 18% and one of credit of 11%, followed by Banco 
Fonsecas, Santos & Viana (BFSV), with roughly 13% of deposits and 8% of credit, 
Banco Nacional Ultramarino (BNU), with close to 11% of deposits and 19% of credit, 
Banco Lisboa & Açores (BLA), with approximately 7% of deposits and 4% of credit, 
Banco Borges & Irmão (BBI), with almost 5% of deposits and 2% of credit, and finally 
Banco Pinto & Sotto Mayor (BPSM) and Banco Português do Atlântico (BPA), both 
with about 3% of deposits and 2.5% of credit (in the case of BPSM), and 2% (in the 
case of BPA). The rest of the banks not listed here were all of a much smaller scale, and 
sometimes only regional. 
The Hirschman-Herfindahl Index (HHI), a measure of market concentration, for 
deposits in the Portuguese commercial banks in 1950 (which excludes CGD) was 0.15 
(Figure 3). The significance of this value in terms of market concentration has no 
immediate interpretation: did this represent a high, moderate, or low degree of 
concentration? There are no generally accepted standards of assessment, but the merger 
guidelines of the US Department of Justice can be used as a benchmark. According to 
its latest version (of 2010), an HHI below 0.15 would reveal a non-concentrated market, 
whereas a value between 0.15 and 0.25 would reveal a moderately concentrated market, 
and a value beyond 0.25 a highly concentrated one (US Department of Justice and 
Federal Trade Commission, 2010). But these figures are subject to fluctuation. In the 
1982 version of the same guidelines the values were different: less than 0.10 for non-
concentrated markets, between 0.10 and 0.18 for moderately concentrated markets, and 
beyond 0.18 for highly concentrated ones (US Department of Justice and Federal Trade 
Commission, 1982). In addition to these indefinitions, international comparisons are 
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also affected by various institutional specificities for each industry and country that 
have an impact on the interpretation of such figures. Still, it would probably not be 
unfair to describe the Portuguese commercial banking market as moderately 
concentrated
4
. 
The concentration ratios in Figure 4 (measuring the proportion of deposits 
appropriated by, respectively, the three, five, and seven largest commercial banks in 
Portugal), together with the international data in Table II, seem to corroborate this idea, 
as they show a degree of concentration that was lower than in Canada or the UK and 
that was not far from France or Spain. 
Twenty three years later, in 1973, the banking structure had changed considerably. 
Commercial banks now held 80% of all deposits in the country (the remaining 20% 
being almost entirely held by CGD) and 65% of credit (INEa, 1973). The number of 
incorporated banks had dropped to 14 (down from 22) (Valério, 2010) and the number 
of non-incorporated banks to 7 (down from 13) (INEb, 1973) (this was not the result of 
failures, but of the transformation of non-incorporated banks into incorporated ones or 
from mergers and acquisitions). 
The 1973 picture reflected the changes in the relative position of the seven largest 
banks that took place since 1950, as Figures 1 and 2 show. In 1973 BESCL was still the 
market leader in deposits and the third largest bank in credit, but its deposits’ market 
share was now much lower (a little more than 12.5%) and that of credit was more or 
less the same. The subsequent positions were now occupied by the two smallest (among 
the seven larger) banks in 1950, BPSM and BPA. Both had jumped from a market share 
of approximately 3% of deposits to one that matched closely that of BESCL (roughly 
12%) and had even been able to overtake BESCL for a few years (BPA between 1965 
and 1969, a period in which it was the market leader, and BPSM in 1967 and 1968). 
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Something similar had happened in terms of credit, and the market share of each of 
these three banks (BESCL, BPA, and BPSM) now matched that of BNU (close to 11%). 
The second bank in 1950, BFSV (which changed name to Banco Fonsecas & Burnay 
after a merger with Banco Burnay in 1967), with a market share of about 5% in deposits 
and 4% in credit, was now the smallest, and even this market share was only possible 
thanks to the merger with Banco Burnay (BB) (BFSV reached its lowest share one year 
before the merger, in 1966). The third bank in deposits in 1950, BNU, was now fourth, 
with a lower share than in 1950 (more or less 9%) and was accompanied by two banks 
of much lower size in 1950 (BLA, which meanwhile had changed its name to Banco 
Totta & Açores thanks to a merger with Banco Totta-Aliança in 1969, and BBI); in 
terms of credit, however, BNU was able to stay at the top, although with a much smaller 
share than 23 years earlier. 
A few aspects of the evolution just portrayed should be underscored: a) the threat 
to the market leader (BESCL) posed by two initially much smaller competitors but that 
proved to be considerably more dynamic throughout this period (BPA and BPSM): 
BPA increased its market share (both of deposits and credit) steadily since the 1950s, 
BPSM only since the 1960s; b) the persistent decline of what was, in 1950, the second 
most important bank in terms of deposits (and third in credit), BFSV; c) the decline of 
BNU, even if much less pronounced than that of BFSV (and still keeping the primacy in 
terms of credit); d) the interesting and dynamic behaviour of an initially small bank that 
was able to reach an intermediate position in 1973, BBI; and e) the decline of a bank of 
intermediate size in 1950 (BLA), which was rescued at the eleventh hour by the merger 
with an institution of similar characteristics, Banco Totta-Aliança (BT-A). We, thus, 
have, on the side of dynamism BPA, BPSM, and BBI, and on the side of decline, 
BFSV, BLA, and BNU. On top, we have BESCL, struggling to keep its position, with 
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initial decline but apparent late recovery. All of this in a general picture of increasing 
importance of commercial banks, winning much away from CGD, in both deposits and 
credit: CGD had now approximately 18% of market share in deposits and 15% in credit. 
A remark should be made about Banco de Fomento Nacional (BFN), the state’s 
investment bank created in 1958. Although it started out as the third largest credit 
institution when it initiated activity in 1960, with close to 9.5% market share, in 1973 it 
had fallen to the lowest position next to Banco Fonsecas & Burnay (BFB) (about 5%) 
(Figure 2). 
We lack good historiographical works on individual banks, but the few that exist 
still allow for some general (and necessarily brief) observations on their evolution 
during this period. Starting with the most dynamic ones, BPA was the first of the 
smallest banks (among the big seven) to make inroads to the top. Created in Porto in 
1942, by the transformation of a banking house, BPA tried from the outset to expand to 
Lisbon. Resistance from the traditional Lisbon banks (BESCL, BFSV, BNU, and BLA) 
and from the Government (which did not authorise the opening of a BPA branch in the 
city) meant that BPA started activity in Lisbon only in 1950, and even then only 
through the acquisition of a smaller local institution (see Banco Português do Atlântico, 
1993, and Bessa-Luís, 1969). From then on growth was constant. BPA introduced new 
goods and services, challenging the tradition of larger rivals. A special aim of BPA was 
popular savings (with special attention to emigrant remittances) in opposition to the 
wealthier clientele of its rivals (Banco Português do Atlântico, 1993). Success was clear 
and the bank set standards that were ultimately adopted by the remaining leading banks, 
including some of the most conservative. 
BPSM only followed a similar evolution after 1960, when a cement tycoon in the 
process of building a large business group, António Champalimaud, bought a majority 
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share of its capital (Câmara, 1989). Until then, BPSM was one of the least active banks 
in the market, continuing along the line of business established since its creation in 1926 
(by transformation of a banking house founded in 1914). But from 1960 on growth was 
steady, with the bank following the same sort of methods introduced by BPA, although 
with closer attention to the new urban middle class rather than the emigrants’ relatives 
in small towns. 
BBI was also among the best performing institutions, even if growing less 
spectacularly than BPA and BPSM. This seems to have been deliberate and related to 
the nature of the bank itself, which was essentially the financial arm of an old and 
traditional business group (Sousa, 1984). Created in 1937 in Porto, by transformation of 
a banking house, the bank long remained mostly regional (although having an office in 
Lisbon) and should be seen mostly as a parcel of the business interests of its owners. 
The rest of those interests (spread among various industrial sectors) was concentrated in 
a sister company called Borges & Irmão Comercial (Sousa, 1984). The bank 
functioned, thus, with a less strict financial logic than other banks. 
Looking now at the declining institutions, we can start with the most spectacular 
case, that of BFSV. Its most important feature was that it remained the only unit bank 
among the big seven, at least until 1967 (Câmara, 1985). The switch into branch-
banking took place only through the merger with BB (see below the figures on 
branching). This was a deliberate policy, with the bank (created in 1937) concentrated 
on its old single office in Lisbon (inherited from the earlier banking house). If in the 
early 1950s this was not much of a problem, as the other banks still had a small branch 
network, it became more serious as time passed, so much so that it led to the ultimate 
decadence of this very traditional bank. Only the merger with BB broke its fall. 
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Conservatism was also a hallmark of BLA. One of the most traditional banks, 
coming from the nineteenth century, it had a prosperous period of boon in the twentieth 
century during World War II, but had much trouble following the modern trends of 
geographical expansion and popular banking (Câmara, 1972). The bank was only 
rescued by the merger with BT-A. The latter had similar size, allowing the new bank, 
Banco Totta & Açores (BTA), to double its market share. 
BESCL is different from the other declining banks. First of all, its decline was 
never comparable to that of BFSV and BLA, as it was able to keep the lead in terms of 
market share, even if at a lower level than at the beginning of the period. Second, 
BESCL, together with BNU, had become during the 1930s and 1940s the first true 
national-sized banks, thanks to a primitive movement of geographical expansion 
(Damas and Ataíde, 2004). But BESCL had difficulties coping with the new 
aggressiveness brought by BPA and BPSM. Still, having been caught at the top by these 
two rivals, it adapted rapidly to the new competitive environment and recovered 
leadership. The late 1960s and early 1970s are, for BESCL, the story of this struggle. 
Mention must also be made of the special case of BNU. BNU had been virtually 
nationalised in 1931, a result of the difficulties felt by Portuguese banks at the 
beginning of the crisis of the 1930s (Valério, 2010). It was a rather strange institution: 
created in 1864 as a private venture dedicated to colonial development, it was also given 
the monopoly of money emission in the colonies, a role it retained (although losing it in 
the case of Angola in 1926) until 1975. But most of its development took place in the 
mainland, a process that made it the largest commercial bank in the country. Between 
1931 and the early 1950s its solvency was progressively restored, and only in the 1950s 
was it possible for the state to withdraw from its administration. This withdrawal, 
however, was only partial, and the state continued to control much of its activity, since 
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it approved the board of directors, while at the same time nominating many of its 
members (Valério, 2010). 
The changes just outlined were reflected in a degree of concentration that fell 
between 1950 and 1973, as measured by both the HHI and the concentration ratios 
(Figures 3 and 4), especially until the early 1960s. The HHI passed from levels around 
0.15 in 1950 to around 0.10 in the 1960s (and remained at that level in 1973), which, 
taking the US Department of Justice values as a benchmark, should be seen as 
corresponding to a non-concentrated market. As for the concentration ratios, the decline 
was particularly pronounced in the CR3 indicator, showing that loss of market power 
took place essentially at the top end of the spectrum. This is certainly a result of the 
erosion of BESCL’s position, thanks to the challenge posed by BPA and BPSM. The 
decline in CR3 is also explainable by a loss of market power of the three largest 
institutions as a whole. As a matter of fact, no other bank was capable during this period 
of reaching BESCL’s market power in 1950, and the three banks in the intermediate 
position, BNU, BBI, and BTA, were not so distant from the three largest ones in 1973. 
That is why the decline of CR5 is less pronounced than that of CR3 and the decline of 
CR7 is overall practically non-existent. By the end of the period the seven leading banks 
were still the same (although reflecting various mergers), but their order in terms of 
importance in the market had been radically altered. 
Although apparently straightforward, measures of market concentration pose 
problems of interpretation when used as a proxy for competitive behaviour. Market 
concentration does not tell us if banks can exert effective market power, and for more 
than one reason: first, concentration may itself be the consequence of high competition; 
in this case, concentration would just be the outcome of a competitive process in which 
the most efficient institutions would have been able to drive the least successful ones 
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out of the market. Consequently, a declining concentration would not necessarily 
indicate more competition. Also, even admitting that higher concentration by itself 
means market power, one needs to wonder about the level beyond which market power 
becomes possible. A further point is that a concentrated market may have other features 
(such as ease of entry, regulations, or technology) not allowing for anti-competitive 
behaviour on the part of the existing agents. Market concentration measures do not, 
therefore, confirm by themselves the existence (or lack) of competition. But they are a 
preliminary indicator, and the behaviour of the measures presented above do raise some 
questions regarding the idea of a “cosy” environment for Portuguese banks, in which 
they could simply rest on their earlier achievements. Next, we will use a series of other 
indicators that are more explicit in this respect. 
 
3. Liquidity, interest rates, deposits, capital, and profitability 
3.1 Liquidity  
Due to the importance attributed to it in the legislation and the literature, we start 
with the issue of cash reserves. Assessing the actual amount of cash reserves held by 
Portuguese banks in this period is not simple, due to a particular accounting issue. Until 
1960, the law allowed banks to register in their books as cash reserves three types of 
assets: actual cash held in their vaults, deposits at the Bank of Portugal, and deposits in 
other commercial banks. In 1960 the General Inspection of Credit and Insurance 
imposed a new standardised system of accounting on banks in which deposits at the 
Bank of Portugal and in other banks were separated from each other. The issue is 
relevant because the Bank of Portugal was, since the 1930s, progressively withdrawing 
from the commercial market. Unfortunately, our knowledge of its operation in the 
postwar period is virtually non-existent. We know that in the 1930s and 1940s the bank 
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was still an important player in the credit market, contributing to the money multiplier 
effect (Reis, 1999). But it is highly probable that changes were more pronounced after 
1950, and that deposits at the Bank of Portugal increasingly became true idle reserves. 
What we do not know is the pace of the process, and one thing for which there is no 
doubt is that deposits in other institutions, despite being counted as reserves, entered in 
the credit cycle. 
In order to partially correct for these problems, we calculate cash reserves held by 
banks in two different ways (Table II). The first (Panel A of Table II) shows cash 
reserves as they were registered in the banks’ books, i.e. including true cash, deposits at 
the Bank of Portugal, and deposits in other banks until 1959. Here the pattern is clear: in 
1950 all banks held reserves in excess of the legal limit by a very large amount; 
however, the subsequent fall was very steep, so that by the early-1960s that amount had 
converged to the legal limit. Panel B of Table II presents the data in a different way: 
from 1960 on cash reserves are those registered in the banks’ books (and thus are equal 
to the data given in Panel A), but between 1950 and 1959 the deposits in other banks are 
skimmed from the overall figure through an estimate separating them from deposits at 
the Bank of Portugal. Now the figures are considerably different: the initial amount of 
reserves is much lower, even if still slightly above the legal limit. This means that most 
of the reserves held by commercial banks in excess of the legal limit in the 1950s 
corresponded in reality to deposits in other commercial banks. Even so, the downward 
trend (although milder) is still visible, and this method of accounting would suggest that 
not only did banks not hold the amount of excess reserves that is normally attributed to 
them, but also that they were already within (or very close to) the legal requirements by 
the early 1950s
 5
. 
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Which of these two ways more correctly accounts for the banks’ cash reserves 
hinges upon the amount of credit actually provided the Bank of Portugal, for which we 
currently do not have enough information. But the figures we have presented do raise 
the possibility that the often mentioned “structural problem” (Valério, 2010) of “excess 
reserves” was, to a large extent, simply an accounting problem. Portuguese commercial 
banks probably managed cash reserves in a much tighter way than usually 
acknowledged, thus questioning the traditional belief in excessive prudence. 
 
3.2 Interest rates, deposits, and branches 
Portuguese commercial banks were forbidden by law to have an autonomous price 
policy, as interest on deposits and credit were indexed to the Bank of Portugal’s 
rediscount rate (see Section 1). The interest margin was, thus, ultimately decreed in an 
exogenous way by the Government. 
However, when we look at the average interest rate practiced on deposits by the 
seven largest commercial banks, we find a not insignificant variance (Figure 6). A note 
should be made about these series. They do not correspond to precise figures of the 
average interest rate of the various banks, but to an estimate. There are two sources of 
imprecision. First, registration of deposits in the banks’ books are separated by just 
three (and sometimes only two) categories: demand deposits, time deposits, and small-
time deposits; but there were many more interest rates, depending on the maturity of the 
time deposits (one month, three months, six months, one year). It is thus impossible to 
directly link the various rates with the various types of deposits. The second source of 
imprecision comes from the fact that in their books banks lumped together into a single 
accounting item all income from interest and all income from commissions. The 
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estimates presented here are the ratio (x100) of all income from interest and 
commissions over all the amount of deposits. 
Despite the imprecise nature of the data, they show remuneration policies 
differing from bank to bank, sometimes by a large amount (Figure 6). In the 1950s the 
difference between the bank paying the lowest average rate and the one paying the 
highest was between the lowest range of 0.5%-0.75% and the highest of 1.5%-1.75%-
2%, and in the 1960s and 1970s the difference was similar, although at higher rates. It is 
easy to see that much of the difference was caused by the rates practised by BBI. But in 
the 1960s more banks adopted similar remunerations. And even if we do not take BBI’s 
rates in the 1950s into consideration, the differences continued to be significant 
(sometimes the highest twice that of the lowest). Another bank that stands out in 
comparison with the others is BNU, although for the opposite reason of BBI: its 
consistency in paying the lower rates in the market. These two contrasting behaviours 
are easily explained by the nature of each of the banks: BBI was the dynamic financial 
arm of a business group, able to squeeze the financial margin in search of funds for 
other activities; BNU was a para-public institution that could pay low interest and still 
attract a large number of depositors, thanks to the implicit protection from bankruptcy 
guaranteed by state ownership. 
If banks could not compete on the interest rates offered to depositors, the only 
explanation for the differences just reported must have lain in the types of deposits held 
in each bank, as time deposits were remunerated at a higher rate than demand deposits. 
Figure 7 shows that indeed the volume of time deposits differed between the various 
banks, even if increasing in all of them during the 1960s. Not surprisingly, taking into 
consideration the previous data on interest, BBI appears as the bank with the highest 
proportion of time deposits most of the time. In 1950 the seven banks under analysis 
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could be classified into two groups in terms of holdings of time deposits: on the hand, 
we had BBI, BPA, BPSM, and BNU, with a higher proportion of time deposits; on the 
other, BESCL, BLA, and BFSV, with the lowest. This fits well with the picture above 
of the most and least dynamic banks. The initial exception is BNU, but it soon 
converged in the rest of the period to the pattern that was typical of the least dynamic. 
The most active in the process of attraction of time deposits were BBI, BPSM, and 
BPA. But all others also entered the race as time passed. In 1973 their figures for time 
deposits ranged between 35% and 50% of all deposits. 
From the 1960s on the attraction of time deposits was, thus, an important 
instrument of competition. Until 1965 there was no legal restriction on the interest 
asked on time deposits (the important legal restriction here being, of course, the one on 
credit, as banks could not offer rates on time deposits for which they could not find a 
match from the assets side). But the introduction of legal limits for rates on time 
deposits in 1965 did not halt their growth. 
The idea of competition through time deposits is supported also by some 
qualitative data. Silva (1967) noted that, in the 1960s, “an increasing number of banks 
launched truly aggressive campaigns in order to attract depositors. Such campaigns 
would not have been very rewarding, however, if banks had not used the return 
associated to those deposits as an instrument. As a consequence [of the existing legal 
limits], the fight had to be concentrated in time deposits”. Various banks seem to have 
even crossed the line of legality: “outdated rates have fostered [banks], in terms of 
liabilities [i.e. deposits], not to comply with the law or to go subtly around the spirit of 
the law” (Silva, 1968)
6
. 
In the 1960s complaints by banks about the legality of the practices of their 
competitors boomed. The meetings of the National Credit Council, where 
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representatives of the various banks and of the Government met, overflowed with such 
complaints. In one of these meetings (June 1964), Fausto de Figueiredo, the 
representative of BFSV, could not have been clearer: “it is common knowledge [...] that 
legal dispositions [...] are not met” (GNBCB, 1964, p. 14). In another meeting, one 
month later, the Visconde da Merceana, representative of BNU, paraphrased an article 
in a Spanish magazine: in a year in which the maximum legal rates on time deposits 
were 3%, some banks paid 4%, 5%, 7%, and even, in the case of certain large accounts, 
10%. According to the Visconde da Merceana, this was “the perfect picture of what is 
happening in Portugal” (GNBCB, 1964, p. 9)
7
. According to Daniel Barbosa, from 
BFN, in a meeting of the Council held in June 1967, besides the manipulation of rates, 
another common practice was to classify demand deposits as time deposits, thus 
allowing for increased attractiveness to clients in terms of both rates and liquidity 
(GNBCB, 1967, p. 19). 
The disregard for legal limits concerning interest rates was so serious that in 1967, 
under the Bank of Portugal’s sponsorship, all commercial banks plus six banking houses 
signed an “Agreement on the Discipline of Banking Activity” (“Compromisso relativo à 
disciplina da actividade bancária”) (GNBCBc, 1967), in which they pledged to respect 
those limits. One year later, however, under the argument that the agreement was not 
being respected by competitors, BESCL withdrew from it (Damas and Ataíde, 2004). In 
1970 a new agreement was signed (GNBCGc, 1970), but the lack of respect for this 
document was universal
8
. Figure 6 shows this: in 1969 all average interest rates of the 
various banks converged to the same value. But in 1970 the difference between them 
had widened again, and continued to do so until 1973. 
Interest was not the only instrument used by banks to attract deposits. Another 
very important one was geographical expansion, typical of markets where competition 
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is otherwise limited. There was throughout this entire period a rush for the opening of 
branches, particularly in the second half of the 1960s. Available aggregate data are very 
patchy, but they still convey a picture of strong growth. According to Sérgio (1990), 
between 1950 and 1959 the Government authorized the opening of 121 branches. 
Pintado and Serra (1966) count 364 branches in 1965 and 539 in the following year, i.e., 
an increase of 165. This means that in one single year more branches were opened than 
during the entire 1950s. According to Carvalho (1973), the number of branches had 
grown to 778 in 1972, more than twice the number of 1965. 
Aggregate data are difficult to obtain, but we have built series for the branches of 
the seven largest banks under analysis. Figure 8 shows the results, confirming the 
general impression of growth. BNU was undoubtedly the bank with the largest presence 
in the country since the 1950s. BESCL was second, but never acquired such a vast 
network as BNU. This confirms the idea that these were the only banks having a true 
national dimension at the beginning of our period of study. BPA displays the most 
consistent growth, very much connected with its strategy of capturing popular savings 
in large cities as well as in small towns. By the 1960s its network was the size of 
BESCL’s. Although growing as much as BPA in the 1960s, BPSM increased its 
network of branches more slowly. This is related with its concentration (contrary to 
BPA) in a more urban clientele. BBI also shows strong growth, with an expansion close 
to that of BPSM in the 1960s, although slower than BPA. BLA shows modest growth 
until the late 1960s, but with a sharp jump in 1970, almost doubling its network thanks 
to the merger with BT-A, allowing it to catch up with BESCL and BPA. Finally, there is 
the case of BFSV, which remained outside of the branch rush until 1967, with just one 
office until 1965 (in Lisbon), and two in 1966 (with the new Porto office). Only the 
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merger with BB allowed BFSV to acquire a network of branches, and even then smaller 
than the rest of the big seven. 
Lack of competition between banks would have been translated into high interest 
rate margins. Figure 9 shows the financial margin, the difference between income 
earned and paid on interest, of the banks analysed. These figures are subject to the same 
sort of shortcomings as the data on interest presented above: they lump together income 
from interest and commissions. Another shortcoming is that the data start in 1960, the 
reason for this being that most banks were not forced by law to publish income earned 
from credit instruments. Still, they show an interesting picture, namely one of 
substantial differences throughout the period. Again, not surprisingly, the bank with the 
closest margin was BBI, and also not surprisingly, the one with the largest was BNU. 
We have seen above that the latter generally practised the lower rates on deposits, and 
the former the higher ones. The margins of other banks fell between the two extremes, 
although BPA converged to lower levels in the last years of the period. Was this high or 
low? Table III provides some figures for other countries. The Portuguese values look 
very much like the norm. 
 
3.3 Capital 
The idea of lack of competitive behaviour of Portuguese banks in this period may 
be questioned by still other data, such as the banks’ capital ratios. Note that the 
legislation of the time did not establish proportional limits but rather absolute amounts 
(see Section 1). When we look into the capital-assets ratios of the banks under analysis, 
they reveal increasingly higher leverage (Figure 10). Well capitalised in 1950 (in a 
range between 7.5% and 11% of their assets, if we exclude BNU) their capital ratios fell 
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steadily throughout the period, so that by 1973 all of them had ratios below 5% 
(between 3% and 4.8%). 
The only exceptions to the generalised pattern shown in Figure 10 are BNU and 
BFSV. BNU was consistent in having the lowest capital ratio of all banks, something 
most probably explainable by its “advantage” as a semi-public institution. Such status, 
implying the impossibility of bankruptcy, meant that it did not need to show any special 
solidity in order to be trustworthy to clients. BFSV represents the almost opposite case: 
being a unit bank unwilling to expand geographically when all other banks were doing 
so quickly, it preferred to invest in solidity, setting it apart from other banks in this 
respect. The more the competitors expanded geographically, the more BFSV had to 
increase its capital, in order to retain and attract depositors. As we will see next, this had 
very serious implications for profitability and ultimately forced the bank to change 
strategy, when it merged with BB. After that moment the bank’s capital ratio converged 
quickly to the general pattern. If we disregard BFSV, the capital ratios of Portuguese 
did not set them apart in international terms (Table IV). 
 
3.4 Profitability 
The argument over the excessively protected environment in which Portuguese 
banks lived rests ultimately on the issue of profitability. Unfortunately, this is one of the 
most difficult measures to obtain with accuracy, as accounting standards and practices 
allow for much imprecision. Capie and Billings (2001), for instance, have revealed the 
significant extent to which the reported profits of the English clearing banks in the 
twentieth century differed from true ones. The main source of divergence were the 
unreported (publicly, although reported secretly) “hidden reserves”. Capie and Billings 
(2001) could only establish the importance of these reserves thanks to a reconstruction 
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of the banks’ profits-and-loss accounts based on unpublished data from the banks’ 
archives. This is something we cannot provide at this stage for Portuguese commercial 
banks. We must, as a result, simply rely on published data. When other information 
from unpublished archival material becomes available it will be possible to compare it 
to our figures. 
With these caveats in mind, the existing data provide an interesting picture. The 
figures for the return on equity (ROE) of the seven largest commercial banks presented 
in Figure 11 are the published after-tax profits calculated as a ratio of equity and reserve 
funds (x100). When we compare them with what we know from other countries (Table 
V), they do not stand out as different, quite the contrary. The exception is, again, BFSV, 
with its low record, something mostly explainable by the extraordinarily high capital 
ratios it had as a consequence of its unit-bank strategy. A visible feature of ROE of 
Portuguese banks is its decline during the 1960s, coinciding with the rush for branches 
and deposits, thus suggesting that more competition led to the squeezing of the banks’ 
profit margins. If, in 1965, ROE of Portuguese banks ranged more toward the high end 
of the international spectrum, the opposite occurred in 1973 (Table V). Figures for 
return on assets (ROA) in Figure 12 provide an even clearer picture of the connection 
between profits and a higher cost structure. These figures show two movements: on the 
one hand, convergence between, and on the other, consistent decline of ROA of the 
various banks, both taking place essentially in the 1960s. The international comparison 
in Table VI shows again that the behaviour of Portuguese banks was not dissimilar to 
other countries. 
Even if these figures will be revised by later findings of unpublished data in 
banks’ archives, they raise doubts about the idea common in the literature that 
Portuguese banks were granted “excess profits” by the existing institutional 
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environment. Perhaps this should not surprise us, if we recall the main features of the 
legislation. As a matter of fact, banks had almost no choice in terms of the interest to 
pay on deposits and on the interest to earn from loans, and had to face, additionally, 
strict limits on the use of alternative assets (such as stocks or bonds). Competition was 
certainly felt in the increase of costs related to the efforts to attract depositors (higher 
interest paid on time deposits, lower interest asked on loans, and higher real estate and 
personnel costs in new branches), but this requires amore detailed study in the future. 
 
Conclusion 
We have shown in this paper that despite the legal restrictions existing in the 
period 1950-1973, Portuguese commercial banks found various ways of competing with 
each other. This raises doubts about the idea, common in the literature, that they lived in 
a “cosy” environment based on “rents” and “excess profits”. The reversals of fortune of 
several of the main banks show that their position in the system was not granted once 
and for all. And the comparisons with banks in much of the western world, despite all 
the problems involved in these comparisons, suggest that they did not live in an 
especially protected environment by international standards. 
The picture we have drawn here is, however, essentially an impressionistic one. 
Any agenda for future research needs to go beyond this and provide more formal tests 
of the degree of competition. A test of the Panzer and Rosser (1987) type is already 
under preparation. But other topics are also worth attention: we have seen that much of 
the evolution of Portuguese banks in this period depended on discretionary measures of 
the Government, such as entry in the market, the opening of branches, and the 
establishment of interest rates. Future works should analyse the political economy 
dimension present in the relationship between Government and banks. A thorough study 
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of the structure of credit is also needed. The banks’ published accounts do not allow for 
detail in this respect. Knowledge of their actual credit policy will have to rely on yet 
unpublished material lying in the banks’ historical archives, although we cannot be sure 
right now of the existence of relevant data on such unpublished material. This is 
precisely one last point in any agenda for future research. Not many banks have 
historical archives, and many of those that have provide only disorganized material. 
Still, individual histories of those banks having good archival material would certainly 
be illuminating. 
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Tables and Figures 
Figure 1 
Market share of deposits of the seven largest commercial banks and the Caixa Geral de Depósitos, 
1950-1973 (%)  
 
Sources: commercial banks,1950-1959: INEc; 1960-1973: Banco Borges & Irmão (1960-1973); Banco Espírito Santo e Comercial de 
Lisboa (1960-1973); Banco Fonsecas, Santos & Viana (1960-1967); Banco Fonsecas & Burnay (1968-1973); Banco Lisboa & Açores 
(1960-1969); Banco Totta & Açores (1970-1973); Banco Nacional Ultramarino (1960-1973); Banco Pinto & Sotto Mayor (1960-1973); 
Banco Português do Atlântico (1960-1973); CGD: INEa. 
 
 
Figure 2 
Market share of credit of the seven largest commercial banks and the Caixa Geral de Depósitos, 1950-
1973 (%)
 
Note: four items in the banks’ accounts were counted as credit: commercial letters, current accounts, creditors and debtors (net), and 
loans (of various maturities). 
Sources: commercial banks, Banco Borges & Irmão (1950-1973); Banco Espírito Santo e Comercial de Lisboa (1950-1973); Banco 
Fonsecas, Santos & Viana (1950-1967); Banco Fonsecas & Burnay (1968-1973); Banco Lisboa & Açores (1950-1969); Banco Totta & 
Açores (1970-1973); Banco Nacional Ultramarino (1950-1973); Banco Pinto & Sotto Mayor (1950-1973); Banco Português do Atlântico 
(1960-1973); CGD: INEa. 
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Figure 3 
Market concentration in Portuguese commercial banking (Hirschman-Herfindahl Index, deposits), 
1950-1973 
 
Note: until 1959 the value of deposits in each bank was published in INEc; after that date this publication disappeared, and the data had to be retrieved 
from the banks’ annual accounts. 
 
Sources: author’s calculations based on:1950-1959, INEa; 1960-1973, Banco Agrícola e Industrial Visiense (1960-1973), Banco da 
Agricultura (1960-1973), Banco do Alentejo (1960-1973), Banco do Algarve (1960-1973), Banco Aliança (1960), Banco de Angola (1960-
1966), Banco Borges & Irmão (1960-1973), Banco Burnay (1960-1967), Banco Espírito Santo & Comercial de Lisboa (1960-1973), 
Banco Fernandes de Magalhães (1960-1973), Banco Ferreira Alves & Pinto Leite (1960-1963), Banco Fonsecas, Santos & Viana (1960-
1966), Banco Fonsecas & Burnay (1967-1973), Banco Intercontinental Português (1972-1973), Banco José Henriques Totta (1960), 
Banco Lisboa & Açores (1960-1969), Banco Nacional Ultramarino (1960-1973), Banco Pinto de Magalhães (1960-1973), Banco Pinto & 
Sotto Mayor (1960-1973), Banco Português do Atlântico (1960-1973), Banco Raposo de Magalhães (1960-1964), Banco Regional de 
Aveiro (1960-1966), Banco Totta-Aliança (1961-1969), Banco Totta & Açores (1970-1973), Companhia Geral do Crédito Predial 
Português (1960-1973). 
 
Figure 4 
Concentration ratios in Portuguese commercial banking (deposits), 1950-1973 (%) 
 
CR3: deposits held in the first three largest banks; CR5: deposits held in the first five largest banks; CR7: deposits held in the first seven 
largest banks 
Sources: see Figure 3 
 
Table I 
Concentration ratios, various countries (CR5) (deposits), 1950-1975 (%) 
 Canada UK France Spain Germany Japan USA Portugal 
1950 80 84 66 68 - 31 13 76 
1955 80 84 70 65 27 29 14 70 
1960 83 83 65 64 24 26 15 65 
1965 86 81 66 58 25 23 14 68 
1970 85 85 57 57 24 21 16 68 
1975 81 70 60 51 24 20 18 67* 
* 1973 
Source: For Portugal, see Figure 3; for the remaining countries Revell (1987), except Spain, Pueyo (2003). 
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Table II 
Cash reserves in Portuguese commercial banks,1950-1973 (% of overall deposits) 
Panel A 
 
Panel A 
 BESCL 
BFSV/ 
BFB BNU 
BLA/ 
BTA BBI BPSM BPA BESCL 
BFSV/ 
BFB BNU 
BLA/ 
BTA BBI BPSM BPA 
1950 38.01 26.30 31.28 30.21 27.60 31.60 29.16 23.04 15.94 18.96 18.31 16.73 19.15 17.67 
1951 33.66 27.17 34.16 26.29 30.45 26.37 23.53 19.76 15.95 20.05 15.43 17.87 15.47 13.81 
1952 25.24 27.66 32.68 25.22 27.32 26.90 31.58 14.21 15.57 18.40 14.20 15.38 15.14 17.78 
1953 36.29 33.55 36.94 27.39 27.68 30.03 25.32 20.78 19.21 21.15 15.68 15.85 17.19 14.50 
1954 32.77 29.89 46.67 22.70 24.06 23.05 28.67 19.20 17.51 27.35 13.30 14.10 13.51 16.80 
1955 25.62 26.74 43.77 20.84 22.66 23.01 30.87 15.50 16.18 26.48 12.61 13.71 13.92 18.68 
1956 29.35 30.54 41.07 20.83 20.86 23.84 23.98 18.12 18.85 25.35 12.86 12.88 14.72 14.80 
1957 24.59 26.92 34.34 20.46 21.18 21.49 20.93 14.57 15.94 20.34 12.12 12.55 12.73 12.40 
1958 26.49 26.94 31.05 19.46 20.25 21.33 22.73 16.08 16.48 18.85 11.82 12.30 12.95 13.80 
1959 22.23 26.97 25.73 19.20 16.15 22.54 20.40 14.03 17.02 16.24 12.12 10.19 14.23 12.88 
1960 17.05 16.92 21.38 18.59 13.38 23.13 15.68 12.72 12.62 15.95 13.87 9.99 17.26 11.70 
1961 14.75 16.67 26.01 15.39 14.29 22.75 17.32 11.77 13.29 20.75 12.28 11.40 18.14 13.81 
1962 16.39 15.42 24.54 13.91 13.88 17.79 17.39 16.39 15.42 24.54 13.91 13.88 17.79 17.39 
1963 15.81 13.23 19.20 14.79 12.21 17.89 16.91 15.81 13.23 19.20 14.79 12.21 17.89 16.91 
1964 14.15 17.02 17.28 16.27 13.14 17.53 14.07 14.15 17.02 17.28 16.27 13.14 17.53 14.07 
1965 11.61 16.17 16.81 15.69 11.25 16.59 12.68 11.61 16.17 16.81 15.69 11.25 16.59 12.68 
1966 12.70 15.88 14.30 17.37 13.48 18.32 17.79 12.70 15.88 14.30 17.37 13.48 18.32 17.79 
1967 15.49 13.45 13.31 20.69 18.35 16.78 15.83 15.49 13.45 13.31 20.69 18.35 16.78 15.83 
1968 14.47 11.06 10.92 20.20 18.46 19.34 18.68 14.47 11.06 10.92 20.20 18.46 19.34 18.68 
1969 13.85 16.53 12.33 20.06 19.12 18.13 17.85 13.85 16.53 12.33 20.06 19.12 18.13 17.85 
1970 14.87 16.00 17.35 20.08 17.61 15.76 13.40 14.87 16.00 17.35 20.08 17.61 15.76 13.40 
1971 13.45 19.74 17.08 20.10 14.99 13.73 13.43 13.45 19.74 17.08 20.10 14.99 13.73 13.43 
1972 14.03 16.31 16.44 18.38 18.07 17.44 13.75 14.03 16.31 17.48 18.38 18.07 17.44 13.75 
Note: Until 1959, commercial banks’ annual reports separated only cash from deposits in other banks, in these being included the Bank 
of Portugal. Thus, in order to separate deposits at the Bank of Portugal from those in other banks, we had to use the Bank of Portugal’s 
annual reports. The figures in these reports are not disaggregated by bank. To obtain the estimate presented here an aggregate ratio 
between deposits at the Bank of Portugal and in other banks was calculated. This ratio was then applied to the figures provided in the 
various banks’ annual reports (the ones in Panel A). The assumption is that the proportion between deposits at the Bank of Portugal and 
deposits in other banks was, for each year, the same in all banks. 
 
Sources: Banco Borges & Irmão (1950-1973), Banco Espírito Santo & Comercial de Lisboa (1950-1973), Banco Fonsecas, Santos & 
Viana (1950-1967), Banco Fonsecas & Burnay (1968-1973), Banco Lisboa & Açores (1950-1969), Banco Nacional Ultramarino (1950-
1973), Banco Pinto & Sotto Mayor (1950-1973), Banco Português do Atlântico (1950-1973), Banco Totta & Açores (1970-1973). 
 
 
Figure 6 
Average interest rate on deposits (seven largest commercial banks), 1950-1973 (%) 
 
 Sources: see Table II. 
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Figure 7 
Proportion of time deposits in total deposits (seven largest commercial banks), 1950-1973 (%) 
 
Source: see Table II 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8 
Number of branches of the seven largest banks, 1950-1973 
 
Source: see Table II 
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Figure 9 
Financial margin (interest margin/total assets) (seven largest commercial banks), 1960-1973 (%) 
 
Sources: Banco Borges & Irmão (1960-1973), Banco Espírito Santo & Comercial de Lisboa (1960-1973), Banco Fonsecas, Santos & 
Viana (1960-1967), Banco Fonsecas & Burnay (1968-1973), Banco Lisboa & Açores (1960-1969), Banco Nacional Ultramarino (1960-
1973), Banco Pinto & Sotto Mayor (1960-1973), Banco Português do Atlântico (1960-1973), Banco Totta & Açores (1970-1973). 
 
 
 
 
 
Table III 
Financial margin (interest margin/total assets) 
 (commercial banks), various countries, 1965-1973 (%) 
 1965 1970 1973 
Belgium 1.71** 1.44 0.54 
Canada 2.12* 2.06 2.16 
Denmark 3.89* 4.65 4.91 
Finland 2.47 2.49 2.67 
Germany 2.19*** 2.24 1.83 
Italy 2.82 2.72 2.50 
Netherlands 2.46 2.42 2.50 
Norway 2.72 2.97 3.00 
Spain 2.79*** 2.73 2.71 
Sweden 2.48*** 2.19 2.36 
USA 2.71 3.19 2.76 
*1966 
**1967 
***1968 
Australia – trading banks; Canada – chartered banks; Denmark, Finland, and Italy – all banks; USA – FDIC insured; all other 
countries – commercial banks 
Source: Revell (1980) 
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Figure 10 
Capital-assets ratio (seven largest commercial banks), 1950-1973 (%) 
 
Source: see Table II 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table IV 
Capital-assets ratio, Portugal and various countries (commercial banks), 1965-1973 (%) 
 1965 1970 1973 
Australia 5.03 5.55 4.23 
Belgium 5.14* 4.54 3.39 
Canada 4.55 3.25 2.61 
Denmark 9.92* 10.18 9.83 
Finland 6.76 4.76 6.44 
France 3.80 2.62 2.54 
Germany 3.55** 3.55 3.48 
Italy 2.05 2.12 1.71 
Netherlands - 5.65*** 4.94 
Norway 6.26 6.41 5.70 
Spain 6.78 8.27 7.55 
Sweden - 6.54 5.43 
USA 8.00 6.58 5.77 
Portugal 4.59 4.68 5.32 
*1966 
**1968 
***1971 
Notes: assets are not weighted by risk 
Australia – trading banks; Canada – chartered banks; Denmark, Finland, France, and Italy – all banks; USA – FDIC insured; all other 
countries – commercial banks 
Sources: for Portugal – INEa; for all other countries – Revell (1980) 
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Figure 11 
Return on equity (seven largest commercial banks), 1950-1973 (%) 
 
Source: see Table II 
 
 
 
 
Table V 
Return on equity, Portugal and various countries (commercial banks), 1965-1973 (%) 
 1965 1970 1973 
Australia 12.60 17.32 20.04 
Belgium 10.70* 11.06 10.79 
Canada 18.38 33.05 37.27 
Denmark 14.91* 15.57 15.30 
Finland 14.50 12.43 9.55 
France 7.96 11.78 18.34 
Germany 19.21** 12.87 9.47 
Italy 40.34 38.56 37.85 
Netherlands - 15.60*** 14.18 
Norway 14.25 14.39 12.49 
Spain 16.26** 18.33 20.72 
Sweden - 7.82 9.40 
USA 8.38 12.87 12.93 
Portugal 16.51 13.57 10.91 
*1966 
**1968 
***1971 
Australia – trading banks; Canada – chartered banks; Denmark, Finland, France, and Italy – all banks; USA – FDIC insured; all other 
countries – commercial banks 
Sources: see Table IV 
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Figure 12 
Return on assets (seven largest commercial banks), 1950-1973 (%) 
 
Source: see Table II 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table VI 
Return on assets, Portugal and various countries (commercial banks), 1965-1973 
 1965 1970 1973 
Australia 0.65 1.00 0.95 
Belgium 0.55* 0.54 0.40 
Canada 0.88 1.14 1.10 
Denmark 1.58** 1.63 1.61 
Finland 0.98 0.59 0.62 
France 0.32 0.39 0.51 
Germany 1.01*** 0.62 0.45 
Italy 0.83 0.82 0.65 
Netherlands 1.28 0.89 0.79 
Norway 0.94 0.96 0.77 
Spain 1.58*** 1.63 1.76 
Sweden 0.78*** 0.52 0.55 
USA 0.70 0.89 0.80 
Portugal 0.46 0.33 0.31 
*1967 
**1966 
***1968 
Notes: Australia – trading banks; Canada – chartered banks; Denmark, Finland, and France – all banks; USA – FDIC insured; all 
other countries – commercial banks 
Sources: see Table IV 
  
  
0,00
0,20
0,40
0,60
0,80
1,00
1,20
1,40
1,60
1
9
50
1
9
51
1
9
52
1
9
53
1
9
54
1
9
55
1
9
56
1
9
57
1
9
58
1
9
59
1
9
60
1
9
61
1
9
62
1
9
63
1
9
64
1
9
65
1
9
66
1
9
67
1
9
68
1
9
69
1
9
70
1
9
71
1
9
72
1
9
73
BESCL
BFSV/BFB
BNU
BLA/BTA
BBI
BPSM
BPA
44 
 
References 
 
AAVV (1994), Handbook on the History of European Banks, Aldershot, Edward Elgar. 
Amaral, Luciano (2003), How a Country Catches-Up: Economic Growth in Portugal in 
the Post-War Period (1950s to 1973), Florence, Doctoral Dissertation at the 
European University Institute. 
Idem (2010), Economia Portuguesa. As Últimas Décadas, Lisbon, Fundação Francisco 
Manuel dos Santos/Relógio d’Água.  
Banco Agrícola e Industrial Visiense (1960-1973), Relatório e Contas, Viseu, Banco 
Agrícola e Industrial Visiense. 
Banco da Agricultura (1960-1973), Relatório e Contas, Lisbon, Banco da Agricultura. 
Banco do Alentejo (1960-1973), Relatório e Contas, Lisbon, Banco do Alentejo. 
Banco do Algarve (1960-1973), Relatório e Contas, Faro, Banco do Algarve. 
Banco Aliança (1960), Relatório e Contas, Porto, Banco Aliança. 
Banco de Angola (1960-1973), Relatório e Contas, Luanda, Banco de Angola. 
Banco Borges & Irmão (1950-1973), Relatório e Contas, Lisbon, Banco Borges & 
Irmão. 
Banco Burnay (1960-1967), Relatório e Contas, Lisbon, Banco Burnay. 
Banco Espírito Santo & Comercial de Lisboa (BES) (1950-1973), Relatório e Contas, 
Lisbon, Banco Espírito Santo & Comercial de Lisboa. 
Banco Fernandes de Magalhães, (1960-1973) Relatório e Contas, Porto, Banco 
Fernandes de Magalhães. 
Banco Ferreira Alves & Pinto Leite (1960-1963), Relatório e Contas, Porto, Banco 
Ferreira Alves & Pinto Leite. 
Banco Fonsecas, Santos & Viana (1950-1967), Relatório e Contas, Lisbon, Banco 
Fonsecas, Santos & Viana. 
Banco Fonsecas & Burnay (1968-1973), Relatório e Contas, Lisbon, Banco Fonsecas & 
Burnay. 
Banco Intercontinental Português (1972-1973), Relatório e Contas, Lisbon, Banco 
Intercontinental Português. 
Banco José Henriques Totta (1960), Relatório e Contas, Lisbon, Banco José Henriques 
Totta. 
Banco Lisboa & Açores (1950-1969), Relatório e Contas, Lisbon, Banco Lisboa & 
Açores. 
45 
 
Banco Nacional Ultramarino (1950-1973), Relatório e Contas, Lisbon, Banco Nacional 
Ultramarino. 
Banco Pinto de Magalhães (1960-1973), Relatório e Contas, Porto, Banco Pinto de 
Magalhães. 
Banco Pinto & Sotto Mayor (1950-1973), Relatório e Contas, Lisbon, Banco Pinto & 
Sotto Mayor. 
Idem (1993), Banco Português do Atlântico: Esboço Histórico, Porto, Banco Português 
do Atlântico. 
Banco Português do Atlântico (1950-1973), Relatório e Contas, Porto, Banco Português 
do Atlântico. 
Banco Raposo de Magalhães (1960-1964), Relatório e Contas, Alcobaça, Banco 
Raposo de Magalhães. 
Banco Regional de Aveiro (1960-1966), Relatório e Contas, Aveiro, Banco Regional de 
Aveiro. 
Banco Totta-Aliança (1961-1969), Relatório e Contas, Lisbon, Banco Totta-Aliança. 
Banco Totta & Açores (1970-1973), Relatório e Contas, Lisbon, Banco Totta & Açores. 
Bank of Portugal (1950-1974), Relatório Anual, Lisbon, Bank of Portugal. 
Barth, James R., Gerard Caprio Jr., and Ross Levine (2001), “Banking Systems around 
the Globe. Do Regulation and Ownership Affect Performance and Stability?”, in 
Frederic S. Mishkin (ed.), Prudential Supervision: What Works and What 
Doesn’t, Chicago, University of Chicago Press. 
Battilossi, Stefano (2000), “Financial Innovation and the Golden Ages of International 
Banking, 1890-1931 and 1958-1981”, Financial History Review, 7. 
Bessa-Luís, Agustina (1969), Banco Português do Atlântico, 1919-1969, Porto, Banco 
Português do Atlântico. 
Câmara, João de Sousa (1972), O Banco Lisboa & Açores, 1875-1969, Lisboa, Banco 
Lisboa & Açores. 
Idem (1985), História do banco Fonsecas & Burnay, Lisboa, Banco Fonsecas & 
Burnay. 
Idem (1989), Banco Pinto & Sotto Mayor, 1914-1989, Lisbon, Banco Pinto & Sotto 
Mayor. 
Capie, Forrest and Mark Billings (2001), “Profitability in English Banking in the 
Twentieth Century”, European Review of Economic History, vol. 5, nº 3, 
December. 
46 
 
Idem (2004), “Evidence of Competition in English Commercial Banking, 1920-1970”, 
Financial History Review, 11.1. 
Capie, Forest and Ghila Rodrik-Bali (1982), “Concentration in British Banking, 1870-
1920”, Business History, 24, 3. 
Carvalho, Guilherme Ribeiro de (1973), “A cobertura bancária da metrópole”, Revista 
Bancária, nº 34, Oct.-Dec. 
Carvalho, Vasco Marques de (2000), Answers to a Puzzle: Monetary Regimes and 
Macroeconomic Performance in the Portuguese 20s, Department of Applied 
Economics, University of Cambridge, Manuscript. 
Cassis, Youssef, Gerald D. Feldman, and Ulf Olsson (eds.) (1995), The Evolution of 
Financial Institutions and Markets in Twentieth-Century Europe, Aldershot, 
Scolar Press. 
Cetorelli, Nicola and Pietro F. Peretto (2000), “Oligopoly Banking and Capital 
Accumulation”, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago Working Papers, nº 12. 
Ciocca, Pierluigi and A.M. Biscaini Cotula (1979), “Le struture finanziarie. Aspetti 
quantitative di longo periodo (1870-1970)”, in F. Vicarelli (ed.), Capitale 
industriale e capitale finanziario. Il caso italiano, Il Molino, Bologna. 
Companhia Geral do Crédito Predial Português (1960-1973), Relatório e Contas, 
Lisbon. 
Damas, Carlos Alberto and António de Ataíde (2004), O Banco Espírito Santo. Uma 
Dinastia Financeira Portuguesa, I Volume – 1869-1973, Lisbon, Banco 
Espírito Santo, Centro de Estudos da História do BES. 
Freixas, Xavier and Jean-Charles Rochet (1997), Microeconomics of Banking, 
Cambridge, Ma., MIT Press. 
GNBCBa (Grémio Nacional dos Bancos e Casas Bancárias) (1964-1973), Minutes 
(Actas) of the meetings of the Conselho Geral of the Grémio Nacional dos 
Bancos e Casas Bancárias, Bank of Portugal Historical Archive. 
Idemb (1964-1973), Minutes (Actas) of the meetings of the Conselho Nacional de 
Crédito, Bank of Portugal Historical Archive. 
Idemc (1964-1972), Annexes to the minutes (Actas) of the meetings of the Conselho 
Geral of the Grémio Nacional dos Bancos e Casas Bancárias, Bank of 
Portugal Historical Archive. 
Guzmán, Mark G. (2000), “Bank Structure, Capital Accumulation and Growth: a 
Simple Macroeconomic Model”, Economic Theory, 16. 
47 
 
INEa (Instituto Nacional de Estatística), (1950-1973), Estatísticas Financeiras, Lisbon, 
INE. 
Idemb (1953-1973), Estatísticas das Sociedades, Lisbon, INE. 
Idemc, (1920-1944), Situação Bancária, Lisbon, INE.  
Lains, Pedro (2008), História da Caixa Geral de Depósitos, 1910-1974 – Política e 
Finanças na República e no Estado Novo, Lisbon, ICS. 
Monnet, Eric (2012), “Financing a Planned Economy. Institutions and Credit Allocation 
in the French Golden Age of Growth (1954-1974)”, Paper presented at the 
London FRESH Meeting, Financial Institutions and Economic Growth in 
Historical Perspective, London. 
Northcott, Carol Ann (2004), “Competition in Banking: A Review of the Literature”, 
Bank of Canada Working Papers, nº 2004-24. 
Panzar, John C. and James N. Rosse (1987), “Testing for ‘Monopoly’ Equilibrium”, 
Journal of Industrial Economics, vol. XXXV. 
Pereira, A. Ramos (1953), “A estrutura bancária portuguesa”, Revista de Economia, 
Vol. VI. Fasc. II, June. 
Idem (1956a), “O mercado monetário em Portugal no período de 1931-1955”, Revista 
de Economia, Vol. IX, Fasc. I, March. 
Idem (1956b), “Considerações gerais sobre o mercado financeiro em Portugal”, Revista 
de Economia, Vol. IX, Fasc. IV, December. 
Petersen, Mitchell A. and Raghuram Rajan (1995), “The Effect of Credit Market 
Competition on Lending Relationships”, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 
110. 
Pintado, Xavier and Alves Serra (1966), “A cobertura bancária da metrópole”, Revista 
Bancária, nº 6, Oct.-Dec. 
Pueyo Sanchéz, Javier (2003), “Oligopolio y competencia en la banca española del siglo 
XX: concentración económica y movilidad intra-industrial, 1922-1995”, Revista 
de Historia Económica, Año XXI, Invierno, nº 1. 
Quenouëlle-Corre, Laure (2005), “The State, Banks and Financing of Investments in 
France From World War II to the 1970s”, Financial History Review, 12. 1. 
Reis, Jaime (1994), “Portuguese Banking”, in Handbook on the History of Banking, 
Cheltenham, Edward Elgar. 
48 
 
Idem (1995), “Portuguese Banking in the Inter-war Period”, in Charles H. Feinstein 
(ed.), Banking, Currency and Finance in Europe Between the Wars, Oxford, 
Oxford University Press. 
Idem (1997), “A Caixa Geral de Depósitos como instrumento de política económica: o 
período entre as duas guerras”, Análise Social, vol. XXXII, nº 141. 
Idem (1999), “The Bank of Portugal’s First Century: From 1846 to the Second World 
War”, in Holtferich, Carl-L., Jaime Reis and Gianni Toniolo (eds.), The 
Emergence of Modern Central Banking from 1918 to the Present, Aldershot, 
Ashgate. 
Revell, JRS (1980), Costs and Margins in Banking, An International Survey, Paris, 
OECD. 
Idem (1987), “Mergers and the Role of Large Banks”, Research Monographs in 
Banking and Finance, nº 2, Bangor, Institute of European Finance, University 
College of North Wales. 
Roquette, José Alfredo Parreira Holtreman et al. (1968), Relatório do grupo de 
Trabalho para o Estudo do Regime das Taxas de Juros para as Operações 
efectuadas pelas Instituições de Crédito, Lisbon, manuscript, Grémio Nacional 
dos Bancos e Casas Bancárias, Historical Archive of the Bank of Portugal. 
Santos, Fernando Teixeira dos (1994), “E o último a aderir ao padrão-ouro, Julho-
Setembro 1931”, in Jorge Braga de Macedo et al., Convertibilidade Cambial, 
Lisbon, Banco de Portugal e Fundação Luso-Americana para o Desenvolvimento. 
Sérgio, Anabela (1990), O Sistema Bancário e a Expansão da Economia Portuguesa 
(1947-1959), Lisbon, Banco de Portugal. 
Silva, Álvaro Ferreira da and Luciano Amaral (2011), “A Economia Portuguesa na I 
República”, in Amaral, Luciano (org.), Outubro: A Revolução Republicana 
em Portugal (1910-1926). Lisbon, Edições 70. 
Silva, Aníbal António Cavaco (1967), O Mercado de Capitais Português no Período 
1961-1965, Lisbon, Fundação Calouste Gulbenkian. 
Idem (1968), O Mercado Financeiro Português em 1966, Lisbon, Fundação Calouste 
Gulbenkian. 
Sousa, Fernando de (1984), Banco Borges & Irmão, 1884-1984, Uma Instituição 
Centenária, Porto, Banco Borges & Irmão. 
49 
 
US Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission (1982), Horizontal Mergers 
Guidelines, Washington, D.C., Department of Justice and Federal Trade 
Commission. 
Idem (2010), Horizontal Mergers Guidelines, Washington, D.C., Department of Justice 
and Federal Trade Commission. 
Valério, Nuno, (1996), “O Banco de Portugal, banco central privado, 1931-1974”, in 
João Ferreira do Amaral (ed.), Ensaios de Homenagem a Manuel Jacinto Nunes, 
Lisbon, Instituto Superior de Economia e Gestão. 
Idem (org.) (2006), História do Sistema Bancário Português, Vol. I, Da Formação do 
Primeiro Banco Português à Assunção pelo Banco de Portugal das Funções 
de Banco Central, 1822-1931, Lisbon, Banco de Portugal. 
Idem (org.) (2010), História do Sistema Bancário Português, Vol. II, Da Assunção pelo 
Banco de Portugal das Funções de Banco Central à União Monetária 
Europeia, 1931-1998, Lisbon, Banco de Portugal. 
Wallich, Henry C. (1951), The Financial System of Portugal, Lisbon, Banco de 
Portugal. 
Wyplosz, Charles (1999), “Financial Restraints and Liberalization in the Postwar 
Period”, CEPR Discussion Paper, nº 2253. 
 
Notes 
                                                 
1
 Translation by the author. 
2
 Translation by the author. 
3
 Translation by the author. 
4
 We should also note that this measure was 0.10 in Spain in 1950 (Pueyo, 2003), 0.16 in Italy in 1930 
(Ciocca and Biscaini Cotula, 1979), and of a similar level in England and Wales in 1920 (Capie and 
Rodrik-Bali, 1982). 
5
 An important note should be made here: cash reserves are calculated as a proportion of all sorts of 
deposits (demand and time). This is important because most of the considerations normally made in the 
literature about excess reserves refer only to cash reserves as a proportion of demand deposits. But, as 
Figure 7 shows, demand deposits became an increasingly smaller proportion of overall deposits in this 
period, and the legal requirements for time deposits were much less stringent than those for demand 
deposits. 
6
 Translation by the author. 
7
 Translation by the author. 
8
 All translations in this paragraph are of the author’s responsibility. 
